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This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both
public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where
public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess
capacity.
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The capacity choice problem in the mixed oligopolies has been analyzed in the
recent papers of Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) and Lu and Poddar (2005)1.T h em a i n
result obtained in these studies is that, in the mixed duopoly market, the public ﬁrm
strategically chooses under-capacity while the private ﬁr mc h oo s e se x c e s sc a p a c i t y .T h i s
result is sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom that holding excess capacity plays
an essential role as a strategic device in the pure oligopoly market. While two papers
cited above employ the model of deterministic demand, Lu and Poddar (2006) extends
the analysis to an uncertain demand environment. They use a simple two-stage mixed
duopoly model where ﬁrms choose capacity in the ﬁrst stage without knowing which
state of nature is going to be realized and show that public ﬁrm may choose excess
capacity depending on the realized demand.
This paper is also concerned with capacity choice of ﬁrms in the mixed market.
However, its focus is somewhat diﬀerent from that of Lu and Poddar (2006). In this
paper, we focus on the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation on the capacity choice behavior,
while the previous literature use a model in which products in a mixed duopoly are
perfect substitutes. Our result shows that while the production diﬀerentiation under
substitute products does not alter the result that public ﬁrm chooses under-capacity
and private ﬁrm chooses excess capacity, the result does not carry over when products
are complements; Both public and private ﬁr m sc h o o s ee x c e s sc a p a c i t yi nt h em i x e d
market.
2. Model
There are two ﬁrms (i =1 ,2) operating in a diﬀerentiated good market with inverse
demand given by
pi = a − qi − bqj a>0,b∈ (−1,1),b6=0 , (1)
where pi is a price for ﬁrm i and qi denotes the output of ﬁrm i.( 1 ) i s d e r i v e d b y
assuming that the surplus of the representative consumer is given by2.
CS = a(q1 + q2) − 0.5(q
2
1 +2 bq1q2 + q
2
2) − p1q1 − p2q2.
The substitutability of the products will be measured by b ∈ (−1,1), where positive
b is associated with substitutes, negative values with complements. While ﬁrm 1 is a
1Nett (1994), Matsumura and Matsushima (2003), and Ishibashi and Matsumura (2005) analyze
the endogenous determination of cost structure in a mixed market under diﬀerent settings.
2In this paper, we employ a version of the consumer surplus function used by Vives (1984), Furth
and Kovenock (1993), and B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003) etc.. Following these literature, the
consumer surplus can be obtained by inserting (1) into CS function. From this substitution, we have
CS = a(q1 +q2)−(q2
1 +2bq1q2 +q2
2)/2−[(a−q1 −bq2)q1 +(a−q2 −bq1)q2], which can be rearranged
as CS =0 . 5 ( q2
1 + q2
2)+bq1q2. Notice that if the two products are perfectly substitutes (b =1 ) ,CS
reduces to a standard expression of Q2/2, where Q ≡ q1 + q2.
1proﬁt maximizing private ﬁrm, ﬁrm 2 is a ﬁrm maximizing the social surplus which is
the summation of consumer surplus (CS)a n dﬁrms’ proﬁts (π1 + π2).
The ﬁrms have same technology, represented by the cost function, C(qi,x i), where
qi and xi are production quantity and capacity of ﬁrm i, respectively. We assume that
ﬁrms choose their capacity in the ﬁrst stage. After observing the capacity choice, ﬁrms
choose their quantities. Following Vives (1986), Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) and Lu
and Poddar (2005), we simply assume that the cost function is given by
C(qi,x i)=mqi +( qi − xi)
2.
Under this U-shaped cost function, the long - r u na v e r a g ec o s ti sm i n i m i z e dw h e nq u a n -
tity equals to production capacity, qi = xi.
The objective function of ﬁrm 1 is its proﬁt, given by
π1 = p1q1 − mq1 − (q1 − x1)
2. (2)
The ﬁrm 2 maximizes the social surplus (SS), given by
SS = CS + π1 + π2, (3)
where CS =0 .5(q2
1 + q2
2)+bq1q2 and πi =( pi − m)qi − (qi − xi)2.
3. Equilibrium
Following the standard equilibrium concept, we solve the model from the second
stage.
Second Stage. Given the production capacities, the ﬁrm 1 maximizes (2) with
respect to q1 and ﬁrm 2 maximizes (3) with respect to q2. The maximization problem
of each ﬁrm yields
q1 =( a − m +2 x1 − bq2)/4, (4)
q2 =( a − m +2 x2 − bq1)/3. (5)
From (4) and (5), we obtain the output levels as
q1 =
(3 − b)(a − m) − 2bx2 +6 x1
12 − b2 , (6)
q2 =
(4 − b)(a − m)+8 x2 − 2bx1
12 − b2 . (7)
First Stage.I n t h e ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms know that the decision on the capacity level
has eﬀects on the ﬁrms’ output decision in the second stage. Hence, we can formulate
the maximization problem of private ﬁrm as follows.
2maxx1 π1 =( a − q1 − bq2)q1 − mq1 − (q1 − x1)
2,
s.t. (6) and (7).
Solving the problem, we have
x1 =
12(3 − b)(a − m) − 24bx2
72 − 24b2 + b4 . (8)
Similarly, the maximization problem for the public ﬁrm can be formulated as
max




2)+bq1q2]+[ ( a − q1 − bq2)q1 − mq1 − (q1 − x1)
2]
+[(a − q2 − bq1)q2 − mq2 − (q2 − x2)
2],
s.t. (6) and (7).
Solving the problem, we have
x2 =
(48 − 15b − 3b2 + b3)(a − m) − 2b(15 − b2)x1
48 − 18b2 + b4 . (9)
From (6)-(9), production quantity and capacity levels are given by
x1 =
12(1 − b)(a − m)
24 − 18b2 + b4 ,
x2 =
(a − m)(b3 − 3b2 − 15b +2 4 )
24 − 18b2 + b4 ,
q1 =
(1 − b)(12 − b2)(a − m)
24 − 18b2 + b4 ,
q2 =
(288 − 168b − 72b2 +2 6 b3 +4 b4 − b5)(a − m)
(24 − 18b2 + b4)(12 − b2)
.
Hence, we have
x1 − q1 =
b2(1 − b)(a − m)
24 − 18b2 + b4 , (10)
x2 − q2 = −
b(1 − b)(a − m)
24 − 18b2 + b4 . (11)
From (10) and (11), we obtain the following result.
Proposition. Assume a>m . For any b ∈ (−1,1), private ﬁrm 1 chooses over-
capacity, x1 >q 1. When the products are substitutes, b ∈ (0,1), public ﬁrm 2 chooses
under-capacity, x2 <q 2, and it chooses excess capacity when the products are comple-
ments, b ∈ (−1,0).
3There is a simple mechanism that justiﬁes the behavior of public ﬁrm. The pub-
lic ﬁrm tries to make private ﬁrm produce much in the duopoly market. When the
products are substitute b ∈ (0,1), from (6), we see that there is a negative relation-
ship between the capacity level of public ﬁrm and the output level of private ﬁrm. In
this case, the public ﬁrm can improve the social surplus by reducing it’s own capacity.
Enlarging the production share in the market is desirable for the private ﬁrm. Hence,
the private ﬁrm chooses over capacity and the public ﬁrm chooses under capacity as a
strategic device. On the other hand, when the products are complements (b ∈ (−1,0)),
an increase in capacity level of public ﬁrm increases the output level of private ﬁrm.
Hence, the under-capacity strategy for public ﬁrm does not carry over in the case of
product complements. In fact, for every b ∈ (−1,0), exactly the opposite is true.
4. Conclusion
This paper introduces the product diﬀerentiation into a mixed duopoly model to
get new result concerning the capacity choice behavior of public ﬁrm. The main result
obtained in the previous literature is that, in the mixed duopoly market with perfect
substitute products, the public ﬁrm strategically chooses under-capacity and private
ﬁrm keeps holding excess capacity. This paper shows this result does not hold in the
market where the products are complements. In fact, for every complementarity’s
parameter, b ∈ (−1,0), both public and private ﬁrms choose excess capacity.
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